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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “I Have a Dream” speech1—one of the most influential and 
immediately recognizable speeches of the twentieth century—is a profoundly 
moving oration that galvanized a nation.  However, if a video of the speech was 
posted online without permission of the copyright owner, it would be 
removed—likely by using a takedown notice.2  The power that a deceased 
author’s estate has over the author’s copyrighted works long after death can 
have severe consequences on anyone who posts them online, and can have a 
chilling effect on free speech.3  As Bill Rutherford, the executive director of the 
Christian Leadership Conference, said, “I think Martin Luther King must be 
spinning in his grave . . . he gave his life for his ideas of justice, peace and love.  
He attempted his entire life to communicate ideas for free.  To communicate, 
not to sell.”4  Though this assertion is undercut by the fact that King himself 
established a copyright over “I Have a Dream” shortly after his speech, the fact 
remains that someone would likely have to pay twenty dollars to view the 
speech legally in its entirety, by purchasing the DVD.5  Today, the rights to the 
video of the speech are held by EMI Music Publishing, a music publishing 
company, which means that video footage of the speech cannot be uploaded 
without EMI’s permission.6  The King Estate is not alone; throughout the past 
100 years, many other estates, such as the James Joyce and J.D. Salinger estates,7 
have leveraged copyright to sell rather than disseminate the famous words of 
their forebears.  With the onset of takedown notices, the power that estates 
hold over public discourse is greater than ever.  The ability of the estates of 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, delivered at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadreeam.htm. 
 2 Alex Pasternack, Copyright King: Why the “I Have a Dream” Speech Still Isn’t Free, MOTHERBOARD, 
Aug. 28, 2013, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/copyright-king-why-the-i-have-a-dream-speech-
still-isn-t-free (where a content owner requests that allegedly infringing material be removed from 
the web pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
 3 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Estate Loses Suit to Control Plays on Janis Joplin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/18/theater/estate-loses-suit-to-control-plays-on-janis-j 
oplin.html. 
 4 Pasternack, supra note 2. 
 5 Alex Pasternack, Web Activists are Waging a Guerilla War to Free Martin Luther King from 
Copyright, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/internet-
activists-are-waging-a-guerrilla-war-to-free-martin-luther-king-from-copyright. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See, e.g., D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, NEW 
YORKER, June 19, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/06/19/the-injusti 
ce-collector; Gordon Bowker, James Joyce’s Grandson Stephen and Literature’s Most Tyrannical Estate, 
DAILY BEAST (June 14, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/14/james-joyce-s-g 
randson-stephen-and-literature-s-most-tyrannical-estate.html (discussing both Joyce and Salinger 
estates). 
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authors and orators to pull speeches, letters, and biographies down from the 
public sphere has grown past the level considered by the Supreme Court only 
eleven years ago when they held that the Copyright Term Extension Act 
comported with the First Amendment.8 
I limit this inquiry to author and orator estates because inherent in this 
discussion is the idea that works created by authors and orators have distinct 
educational value.  Though as a society we generally shy away from valuing 
different forms of speech, when copyright is abused online the effect may be 
felt disparately by those seeking to educate or create derivative works that may 
shine light on the original.  For example, it is not beyond the realm of 
possibility that high schoolers would be better educated by viewing the video of 
the “I Have a Dream” speech rather than reading it in their textbook.  
Dissemination through video is a powerful medium that is threatened by our 
current Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) system.9  
It’s unsurprising that estates zealously attempt to protect the copyrights they 
hold: The estate of a dead celebrity can be extremely lucrative.10  For instance, 
in 2012, Michael Jackson’s estate raked in $145 million, while Elizabeth Taylor’s 
estate was able to make $210 million.11  Entertainers are not the only people 
who make money long after they are dead—Charles Schultz, the creator of the 
Peanuts comic strip characters, made $37 million in 2012.12  
Because estates have the potential to make great sums of money after the 
creator of the work is dead, they have a vested interest in keeping that work 
secure and profitable.  The internet is still relatively young and has transformed 
the way that we transmit information and display our created works.  It only 
makes sense, therefore, that there is a legal mechanism in place allowing rights 
holders to assert copyright claims over material posted online.  However, the 
current system is one that encourages bad copyright claims by “malicious” 
estates, and chills free expression on the Web.13  Moreover, the DMCA’s notice 
and takedown system inherently fails to record how often these negative effects 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 168 (2003) (petitioners made a First Amendment free speech 
challenge to the extension of copyright protection to life of the creator plus seventy years.  The 
Court found that the CTEA comported with the First Amendment and contained adequate 
safeguards of free expression.). 
 9 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-340, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 
(1998). 
 10 Rebecca F. Ganz, Note and Commentary, A Portrait of the Artist’s Estate as a Copyright Problem, 
41 LOY. L.A. REV. 739, 740 (2008). 
 11 Dorothy Pomerantz & Zach O’Malley Greenburg, The Top Earning Dead Celebrities 2012, 
FORBES, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/special-report/2012/1024_dead-celebrities.html. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Emily Meyers, Note, Art on Ice; The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 219, 233–34 (2007). 
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occur.  The system, which pulls material off the Web, also disincentivizes 
content uploaders from fighting back or litigating a fair use defense against a 
copyright holder.14  Thus, many of the “chilling effects” are felt, even if not 
seen directly.  However, the estate cases highlighted above are indicative of the 
underlying problem online as this Note will further discuss.  
Part II of this Note will discuss the United States copyright law landscape, 
from its origins in the Constitution to its current state on the internet, including 
a discussion of two Supreme Court challenges (Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. 
Holder) to modern copyright laws.  Part III will analyze how the considerations 
the Supreme Court took into account in those cases have been warped by our 
current DMCA system.  In order to protect these First Amendment 
considerations, several solutions will be discussed, including a modified 
licensing system, an automation of the DMCA system, and several proposals 
from legal commentators. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section will discuss the current copyright landscape, beginning with 
basic rights of copyright holders.  The discussion will then turn to defenses to 
copyright claims under section 106 of the Copyright Act.  Next, three estates 
will be presented as examples of how estates wield great power in our current 
copyright system.  Two challenges to our current copyright system, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder will be used to illuminate the First Amendment 
considerations of copyright law.  Next, a discussion of the DMCA will show 
how our copyright protections often operate on the internet. 
A.  BASIC RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 
The United States Constitution itself provides the origins of copyright law 
by granting Congress the power to “[P]romote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15  The rights of 
copyright holders are codified in section 106 of the Copyright Act.16  These 
protections begin from the instant an author fixes a work in a tangible medium 
of expression (such as a writing, drawing, sculpture, etc.) so long as the work is 
                                                                                                                   
 14 See, e.g., David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 
554–55 (2010) (noting that a Stanford professor’s fair use claim against the Joyce estate was made 
possible through access to pro bono counsel, not available to most ordinary parties). 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 16 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012). 
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sufficiently original.17  Copyright protection for a work lasts for the life of the 
author, plus seventy years after the death of the author.18 
The Copyright Act grants several exclusive rights to authors.19  First, the 
right of reproduction is arguably the most important protection afforded author 
and orator estates, and violations of this section lead to many lawsuits.  
Copyright holders also possess the right of adaptation—or “derivative works.”20  
This right requires those who write something based on a novel or play to get 
the creator’s permission to avoid infringing the underlying work.21  It is this 
derivative right which led the J.D. Salinger estate to file a successful suit to 
prohibit publication in the United States of Frederick Colting’s 60 Years Later: 
Coming Through The Rye.22  Another right belonging to authors or their estates is 
the right to control the first distribution of each copy of a work to the public.23  
Estates invoke this right when they want to prohibit letters and other works of 
the author from becoming known.  In addition, estates possess the power to 
prevent the public performance24 or display of a work,25 and the ability to 
control a digital audio transmission26 (such as the “I Have a Dream” speech).  
Lastly, creators enjoy some moral rights to prevent their names from appearing 
on material falsely attributed to them, and stop others from claiming creation of 
their own works; however, these moral rights only apply to works of visual art 
in limited runs.27    
B.  DEFENSES TO COPYRIGHT CLAIMS UNDER § 106 
The Copyright Act additionally codifies several affirmative defenses available 
to alleged infringers in sections 107–122.28  Perhaps the most important defense 
in the context of derivative works is “fair use.”29  Courts analyze the frequently 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Id. § 106(1)–(5).  See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
347 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 18 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a); see also Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (retroactively extending copyright protection an additional twenty years 
beyond the 1976 Copyright Act’s term for works created on or after January 1, 1978). 
 19 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).  See also David Shipley, An Overview of Intellectual Property Law (on file with 
the Journal). 
 20 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 23 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 24 Id. § 106(4). 
 25 Id. § 106(5). 
 26 Id. § 106(6). 
 27 Id. § 106A. 
 28 Id. §§ 107–122. 
 29 Id. § 107; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1979). 
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litigated fair use defense using a balancing test.30  First, a court considers “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial 
nature or is of nonprofit educational purposes.”31  Second, a judge will consider 
“the nature of the copyrighted work.”32  A work that is more scientific, 
technical, or less artistic weighs in favor of finding fair use.33  This second factor 
embodies the fact-expression dichotomy, which draws a line between 
unprotected facts or ideas and an author’s protected expression of that idea.34  
Third, a court evaluates the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”35  The court is more likely to find 
a fair use defense when smaller portions of the work are used.36  The final 
factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”37 
C.  PROTECTION OF AUTHOR AND ORATOR ESTATES 
Suits asserted to invoke the protection of one of the exclusive rights are 
often invoked by estates seeking to limit the dissemination of a work.  Recently, 
the Martin Luther King estate, the J.D. Salinger estate, and the James Joyce 
estate have exemplified the great power estates can wield. 
1.  Martin Luther King Estate.  In the mid-1990s, CBS sought to create a 
segment of The 20th Century with Mike Wallace called “Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and the March on Washington.”38  In creating the segment, CBS used about 
sixty percent of Martin Luther King’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech 
delivered on August 28, 1963 to a crowd of about 200,000, and broadcast to a 
nationwide audience.39  About a month after delivering the speech, King had 
taken the necessary steps to seek copyright protection under the Copyright Act 
of 1909 by registering his copyright before publishing the speech.40  When CBS 
                                                                                                                   
 30 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing four factors to consider). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 What is Fair Use?, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html (last visited Sept. 6, 
2014). 
 34 See Feist Publications, Inc., 490 U.S. 340, 348 (“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does 
not mean that every element of the work may be protected.  Originality remains the sine qua non of 
copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that 
are original to the author. . . . Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not 
the precise words used to present them.”); see also 17 U.S.C. 102(b). 
 35 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 36 What is Fair Use?, supra note 33. 
 37 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 38 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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created the segment, however, it failed to negotiate a license with his estate, and 
his estate sued for copyright infringement.41  There was some question in the 
lower courts as to the facts, but there was evidence that an advance text of the 
speech was available in a press tent that day.42  In addition, the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference sent out a newsletter with the exact words of 
the speech.43  On appeal by the state, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the estate did have the authority to prohibit the speech from being 
broadcast.44  Since the authority to broadcast the speech was granted to a 
limited group for a limited purpose, the restrictions on copying and reproducing 
were implied.45  In overturning summary judgment for CBS, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied on precedent indicating that distribution to the new media for the 
purpose of news coverage is only a limited publication46 and that, here there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a publication had occurred.47 
2.  J.D. Salinger Estate.  Another estate is notorious for its vigorous use of 
copyright, originating with the author himself: the estate of J.D. Salinger.  J.D. 
Salinger is best known for the book The Catcher in the Rye, published in 1951.48  
After he stopped publishing books in 1965, he shunned his acquired fame, 
attempting to avoid journalists and fans alike—essentially becoming what 
Holden Caulfield had attempted to become in The Catcher in the Rye.49  He tried 
to keep his unpublished works secret (there is evidence he continued to write 
regularly and kept his writings in a fireproof safe in his home),50 and would not 
allow alteration of his published works even though by doing so he was 
forgoing any possible royalties.51  Despite his attempt to fade back into 
obscurity, his ability to do so was severely diminished as his notoriety for closely 
guarding his personal life and works reached almost the same heights as his 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Since there was a legal question as to whether King’s permission had been given for the 
distribution at the tent or through the newsletter, the court disregarded this evidence at the 
summary judgment stage.  See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1348 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
 44 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., 194 F.3d at 1218. 
 45 Id. See also Burke v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1979) (superseded by statute) 
(allowing a man who filmed animal behavior and gave the film to a professor for use in lectures 
to recover when the professor released the film to a British company). 
 46 Estate of Martin Luther King, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.  
 47 Id. at 1220. 
 48 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (1951). 
 49 Id. at 26. 
 50 Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger’s Literary Estate, 31 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 29 (2012). 
 51 Id.  
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fame for literature in his final years.52  In a rare interview from 1976, speaking 
about an unpublished set of short stories that were going to be released to the 
public, Salinger said, “Someone’s appropriated [the stories].  It’s an illicit act.  
It’s unfair.  Suppose you had a coat you liked and somebody went into your 
closet and stole it.  That’s how I feel.”53  He sued for copyright infringement 
with some regularity, but two cases from the Second Circuit are particularly 
pertinent—Salinger v. Colting54 and Salinger v. Random House.55  
In Random House, Salinger appealed to the Second Circuit an order denying 
his motion for a preliminary injunction against the defendants Ian Hamilton 
and Random House, who were seeking to publish a biography of Salinger called 
J.D. Salinger: A Writing Life.56  This biography would have included unpublished 
letters Salinger wrote to his friends and colleagues between 1939 and 1961, 
including letters to Judge Learned Hand and Ernest Hemingway.57  In May of 
1986, Salinger received a draft version of this biography and discovered that 
these letters had been donated to various university libraries.58  He immediately 
registered seventy-nine of his unpublished letters for copyright protection and 
directed his lawyers to object to any publication of the biography until the 
defendants removed all material from his unpublished letters.59  The defendants 
failed to comply and asserted a fair use defense when Salinger subsequently 
sued for infringement.60  The District Court judge found fair use, explaining 
that “Hamilton’s appropriation of copyrighted expressions are too minimal to 
subject Salinger to any serious harm.”61  On appeal to the Federal Circuit Judge 
Newman granted a preliminary injunction, stating that even though the use of 
the letters for a biography leans in favor of finding fair use, biographers do not 
face a dilemma of infringing on copyright when they take only factual 
information from the letters.62  However, Hamilton had used sentences in a way 
that “exceed[ed] that necessary to disseminate the facts,” thereby also capturing 
Salinger’s expression.63  Moreover, the copied words were a very important part 
of the biography, which weighed against the defendants on the third factor of 
                                                                                                                   
 52 Id. 
 53 Lacey Fosburgh, J.D. Salinger Speaks About His Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1974, at 1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/09/13/specials/salinger-speaks.html. 
 54 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 55 Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 56 Id. at 92.  
 57 Id. at 92–93. 
 58 Id. at 93. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. at 94. 
 61 Id. (quoting Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
 62 Id. at 96. 
 63 Id. at 98. 
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the fair use test.64  The court denied Hamilton’s fair use defense because the 
ability to copy expressive content of unpublished letters did not interfere with 
“the process of enhancing public knowledge of history or contemporary 
events.”65 
Twenty years later, shortly before his death, Salinger filed another 
infringement claim against Frederick Colting, author of 60 Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye.66  In Colting, Salinger alleged that Colting’s main character of the 
novel Mr. C was obviously intended to be Holden Caulfield, the protagonist 
from Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, as an old man.67  In addition, the novel 
included Salinger himself as a character.68  The trial court granted Salinger a 
preliminary injunction, and held that the defendants were unlikely to be able to 
mount a fair use defense—because, among other things, the defendant was at 
that point calling the book a literary critique, but had previously called it a 
sequel.69  The court also emphasized “some uses . . . so patently infringe 
another’s copyright, without giving rise to an even colorable fair use defense, 
that the likely First Amendment value in the use is virtually nonexistent.”70  
After his death, Salinger’s family reached a settlement with Mr. Colting, denying 
him the rights to publish 60 Years Later in the United States.71  As one 
commentator reflected, “[I]n the end, Salinger could not put the genie back in 
the bottle, though his faithful estate did manage to deny the genie an American 
visa, for what that’s worth.”72  
3.  James Joyce Estate.  The James Joyce estate has also prolifically sought to 
invoke the protections of copyright law.  Currently, the James Joyce estate is 
managed by Joyce’s grandson, a man who insists on being referred to by his full 
name—Stephen James Joyce.73  Since obtaining control of the estate, Joyce 
crusaded to prohibit use of his grandfather’s works.74  Though there were 
around 1,500 of Joyce’s letters in libraries and archives throughout the world, 
should anyone attempt to publish those letters, they would be met with a 
copyright claim from Stephen Joyce.75  The Joyce estate forbade the publishing 
                                                                                                                   
 64 Id. at 98–99; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 65 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 66 Id. at 71.  
 67 Id. at 71–72. 
 68 Id. at 72. 
 69 Id. at 82. 
 70 Id. at 82–83. 
 71 Will Wilkinson, J.D. Salinger’s Miserly Legal Legacy, COPYWRONGS BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:57 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/01/copywrongs. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Max, supra note 7. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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of an epilogue to a biography of Joyce’s wife, which noted the years that Joyce’s 
daughter Lucia spent in a mental hospital battling schizophrenia.76  Stephen 
Joyce then announced that he had destroyed all letters from Lucia and 
correspondence between Lucia and a former romantic partner.77  However, he 
remarked that he had “not destroyed any papers or letters in my grandfather’s 
hand, yet.”78  
Through the years, the Joyce Estate has also litigated to try to halt public 
readings of Joyce’s works.  The estate even told a performance artist planning to 
recite a portion of Finnegans Wake onstage that he had “already infringed” the 
estate’s copyright.79  The performer, Adam Harvey, later learned that there was 
no real legal way for Stephen Joyce to stop his performance within the British 
legal system.80  In addition, the Joyce estate spent twenty years denying the 
request by singer Kate Bush to use part of Ulysses.81  Bush first asked for 
permission to use Molly Bloom’s (an important character in Ulysses) soliloquy as 
part of her song “The Sensual World.”82  Finally, in 2011 Stephen Joyce allowed 
Bush to use the lyrics, at which point she re-released the song under the title 
“Flower of the Mountain.”83  In a display of the arbitrariness with which estates 
may wield copyright power, Stephen Joyce had previously permitted the same 
lyrics to be used in the Euro-pop dance hit “Yes” by Dutch pop singer 
Amber.84  Though the EU considers Joyce’s works to be in the public domain, 
many of his works retain their copyright protections in the U.S.85   
The Joyce estate’s most famous copyright battle came in 2006 with 
professor Carol Shloss.86  Shloss wrote a book about Joyce’s daughter entitled 
Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake, and the estate forced her to remove much of 
the book’s content.87  Lucia was met with mixed reviews, not in small part 
because Schloss was unable to back up her contentions with sufficient 
                                                                                                                   
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 D.T. Max, Kate Bush’s Rewrite, Reasons to ReJoyce?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 11, 2011, http://www. 
newyorker.com/books/page-turner/kate-bushs-rewrite-reason-to-rejoyce. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Joyce Works in Copyright and in the Public Domain, INT’L JAMES JOYCE FOUND., http://joycefounda 
tion.osu.edu/joyce-copyright/fair-use-and-permissions/about-law/public-domain (last updated Apr. 
2012). 
 86 Max, supra note 7; see also Ganz, supra note 10. 
 87 Id. 
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evidence.88  She later uploaded a supplement to the book designed to comport 
with U.S. fair use doctrine.89  Shloss then sued the estate to gain rights to the 
published works and family letters.  When the parties eventually reached a 
settlement, the court awarded Shloss $240,000 in legal fees.90 
D.  MODERN COPYRIGHT AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
1.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  As shown by these estates, there 
are major First Amendment concerns implicated when estates assert power 
over their copyright works.  In 1998, Congressman and singer Sonny Bono 
sponsored the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which defines our 
modern copyright landscape.91 Critics often derisively call this act “The Mickey 
Mouse Protection Act,” because it passed right before Mickey Mouse would 
have entered the public domain.92  The CTEA protected other lucrative 
copyrighted works as well, including the song “Yes! We have No Bananas” and 
Winnie the Pooh.93  
The CTEA made several important changes to copyright law.  Most 
importantly, the Act increased the duration of copyright for both current and 
future copyrighted works.94  Before the CTEA, copyrights lasted from the time 
of the work’s creation until fifty years after the creator died, whereas now they 
last from time of creation until seventy years after the death of the author.95  
Though the Act did not restore copyright protections to anything then already 
in the public domain, it did extend protection to many works that were about to 
enter the public domain until the year 2018.96  There is an exception in the law 
that allows libraries, archives, and nonprofit educational institutions to 
essentially treat works as they would have been treated before the law was 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Cynthia Haven, Stanford Researcher Gets Six-Figure Settlement from James Joyce Estate, STAN. REP. 
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/september28/shloss-joyce-settlement-09 
2809.html. 
 89 Sam Whiting, Biographer Took on Joyce’s Heirs to Quote Him, SFGATE (Mar. 18, 2010), http:// 
www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Biographer-took-on-Joyce-s-heirs-to-quote-him-3269891. 
php.  
 90 Haven, supra note 88.   
 91 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 92 Jeff John Roberts, Will Copyright be Extended 20 More Years? An Old Debate Returns, GIGAOM, 
Aug. 20, 2013, http://gigaom.com/2013/08/20/will-copyright-be-extended-20-more-years-an-ol 
d-debate-returns/. 
 93 Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Primer, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/w 
p-srv/technology/articles/eldredprimer_100902.htm. 
 94 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 303 (2012). 
 95 Office of the Gen. Counsel, Summary of Federal Laws, CATH. U. AM., http://counsel.cua.edu/ 
fedlaw/ctea.cfm (last updated May 2, 2013). 
 96 See Roberts, supra note 92. 
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/7
2014] TO SPEAK, PERCHANCE TO HAVE A DREAM  189 
 
passed if they are being used for preservation, scholarship, or research.97  
However, this exception only applies if the work is not subject to normal 
commercial exploitation, cannot be obtained at a fair price, and the copyright 
owner can stop use of the work if they provide notice.98  
Miriam Nisbet, legislative counsel to the American Library Association, 
argued that the CTEA would hurt the flow of information on the internet by 
limiting the accessibility of information.  Nisbet saw this as the main purpose of 
the internet.99  In addition, she argued that the extension of copyright that far 
into the future shifts the balance between creators and the public overly 
towards the creators’ favor.100   
2.  Eldred v. Ashcroft.  Others criticized the CTEA’s term extension as well.  
Eric Eldred, who ran the Eldritch Press (an online publisher of public domain 
works), challenged the CTEA shortly after its passage.101  Other publishers of 
literature, sheet music, film and the American Library Association joined 
Eldred’s challenge.102  Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig argued the 
case.103  The Walt Disney Company, the Motion Picture Association of 
America, the Recording Industry Association of America, and the American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers supported the government.104  
Eldred challenged the law based on two grounds: first, that the Constitution’s 
Copyright Clause was violated and, second, that the law violated the First 
Amendment protection of free speech.105  The Supreme Court ultimately 
upheld the CTEA as valid both under the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment.106 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg offered several reasons why the 
CTEA did not violate the First Amendment.  First, the temporal relation 
between the passage of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 97 See Office of the Gen. Counsel, supra note 95; see also 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
 98 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2)(A)–(C).  
 99 See Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Primer, supra note 93 (“We see the Internet as a way of expanding 
the accessibility of information for people, [and] information that may have been only available to 
a few people.  We hate to see that potential limited in such a way.”). 
 100 See id. (“It just takes [copyrights] so far into the future that the balance that you’re talking 
about seems to be entirely in favor of the creators and leaving out any benefit to the public.”). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. (plaintiffs included a publisher of genealogies, sheet music publishers, and dealers of rare 
books).  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003).  
 106 Id. 
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reasoning indicated that they are compatible with each other.107  In addition, 
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that current copyright laws contained First 
Amendment protections by only protecting an author’s individual expression, 
rather than the underlying facts.108  Justice Ginsburg also relied on the 
protections of the fair use defense as another bulwark against First Amendment 
encroachment.109  Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that the CTEA provides 
additional First Amendment safeguards, such as allowing libraries to reproduce 
and distribute copies of certain published works for scholarly purposes during 
the twenty years added by the Act, and an exemption for small businesses from 
paying performance royalties on music played from licensed electronic 
mediums.110  
Justice Ginsburg also found the third argument that the respondents 
brought lacked merit.  Eldridge argued that under Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC this was an undue burden of the First Amendment like the statute at 
issue in Turner.111  Ginsburg distinguished this case because the CTEA is not a 
“must carry” provision; it is essentially the opposite and, therefore, does not 
likewise implicate “the heart of the First Amendment.”112  Concluding, she 
simply reiterated that existing First Amendment safeguards were “generally 
adequate” and confirmed the constitutionality of the CTEA.113  
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that this extension essentially makes the 
copyright term “virtually perpetual.”114  The grant benefits not creators 
themselves, but their “heirs, estates, or corporate successors.  Most importantly, 
its practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit the progress of ‘Science’—by 
which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge.”115  Justice Breyer also 
argued that under the First Amendment Congress lacked authority to pass the 
CTEA, as it risked serious “expression-related harm”—by restricting the 
propagation of copyrighted works, by interfering with efforts to educate, and by 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Id. at 219 (“This proximity [in time] indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited 
monopolies are compatible with the speech principles.  Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote 
the creation and publication of free expression.”). 
 108 Id. (“[T]his idea/expression dichotomy strikes a balance between the First Amendment and 
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218)). 
 109 Id. at 220 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.; see also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (a statute required cable 
operators to hold some stations open through their cable systems to promote local networks met 
intermediate scrutiny because it was content neutral). 
 112 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 641).   A “must carry” provision compels, 
rather than prohibits, a carrier broadcasting of a certain kind of speech by carriers.  Id. at 220–21. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id.  
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benefiting private financial institutions of corporations and heirs at the expense 
of the public.116  For these reasons, Justice Breyer felt that the statute was 
untenable under the Copyright Clause, read in the light of its First Amendment 
restrictions.117 
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated the holding of Eldridge in light of a 
First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, which 
“eliminated the renewal requirements for works created between 1964 and 1977 
and thus extended their term,” and the CTEA, which “effected a further 
extension.”118  The court in Kahle ultimately decided that the discussions in 
Eldred were not dicta, and reaffirmed that retroactively extending the term of 
existing copyrights does not violate the First Amendment.119  Furthermore, the 
court agreed that “safeguards such as fair use and the idea/expression 
dichotomy [sufficiently] vindicate the speech interests affected by the CRA and 
the CTEA.”120  In all, the court essentially repeated the majority’s arguments in 
Eldridge, putting to rest any lingering First Amendment judicial challenges to the 
recent extensions in copyright protection. 
3.  Golan v. Holder.  In addition to Eldred, the Supreme Court also discussed 
copyright concerns intersecting with the First Amendment in Golan v. Holder.121  
This suit challenged the Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act, which applied 
copyright protections to foreign works between the years 1923–1989 (before 
the United States joined the Berne Union).122  In effect, it took many works out 
of the public domain, including works created in countries that had a copyright 
relationship with the U.S. but did not have a valid U.S. copyright, works created 
in countries with which the United States lacked a copyright relationship (such 
as Russia and China), and all sound recordings from eligible foreign countries 
published after February 15, 1972.123  According to Marybeth Peters, head of 
the U.S. Copyright Office, the number of works affected by the Act would 
“probably number in the millions.”124  The Act’s passage meant that those who 
had their copyrights “restored” would now charge fees for works that the 
challengers previously used for free.125  
                                                                                                                   
 116 Id. at 266. 
 117 Id. at 266–67. 
 118 Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (2007). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 700 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20). 
 121 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 122 Id. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 123 Id. at 904 (copyright relationships entail some form of reciprocal international copyright 
protections). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. (noting, as an example the score of Shostakovich’s Preludes and Fugues Op. 87, the price 
of which has risen sevenfold). 
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In Golan v. Holder, Justice Ginsburg, again writing for the majority, analyzed 
the URAA under the First Amendment.126  She noted that a restriction of the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment is the “inherent and 
intended effect of every grant of copyright.”127  However, unlike in Eldred, the 
petitioners had access to the materials before they were pulled from the public 
domain.128  Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg argued that the text of the Copyright 
Clause and the historical record did not prevent Congress from restoring 
copyrights.129  She also held that nothing warranted “exceptional First 
Amendment solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public 
domain.”130  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument 
that there were any public “vested-rights,” noting that no one in the public 
gains ownership rights as to formerly protected material once that material 
passes into the public domain.131  In addition, Justice Ginsburg supported the 
majority’s conclusion by noting that section 514 of the Act did not entirely 
prohibit public access—it merely required licensing.  As an example, Ginsburg 
offered that “Peter and the Wolf could once be performed free of charge; after 
§ 514 the right to perform it must be obtained in the marketplace.”132  Without 
this practice, orchestral concerts with copyrighted music would not exist unless 
the original composer performed them, indicating that Congress had included 
necessary public access protection.133 
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg also observed that implementing the Berne 
Agreement standardized a copyright regime across countries, and put foreign 
works in the position they would be in if the URAA had been in effect at the 
time they were published.134  In her view, this spared creators the continued 
effects of deprivation of royalties for their works until their copyright terms 
expire, rather than taking away works from users.135  
Justices Breyer and Alito took a different view from the rest of the Court.136  
In Justice Breyer’s dissent, he argued that the URAA did not promote the 
production of new material and imposed high costs that would severely restrict 
dissemination of works that could otherwise serve educational or cultural 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Id. at 889 (majority opinion). 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. at 875, 891. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 892.  
 132 Id. at 893. 
 133 Id. at 892–93. 
 134 Id. at 889–91. 
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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purposes.137  Justice Breyer then analyzed the poor outcomes and restrictions 
on dissemination springing from the Act’s practical effects.138  First, by 
affording new protections to works previously in the public domain, those who 
could once use works freely would often have to pay a high price.139  For 
example, Justice Breyer noted how many orchestras and school music programs 
would be unable to afford the new prices, and therefore would have to go 
without the music they were once able to use for free.140  
Next, Justice Breyer criticized the Act’s large administrative costs.141  Those 
wishing to use pre-existing works must first determine whether it is a work with 
restored copyright, find the copyright holder, and then negotiate a fee.142  This 
is particularly problematic for “orphan works”—those works that were old and 
obscure, or otherwise assigned to a copyright owner who proves difficult to 
track down.143  There are millions of “orphan works,” and the cost of finding 
the authors could be prohibitively high.144  Justice Breyer also argued that 
administrative costs were counterproductive because they will tempt users to 
pirate works rather than do without them.145  Though he did not find this to be 
a content-based restriction, in concluding his dissent Justice Breyer argued that 
the speech related harms in the case raised a First Amendment question as to 
whether there were reasonable justifications for the harms that the Act would 
impose.146  
E.  NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN—DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT  
1. The Basics of Notice and Takedown.  The DMCA also shapes our modern 
copyright law landscape and was created to try to strike a balance between 
internet service providers (ISPs), internet hosts, and users.147  The DMCA 
includes a “safe harbor provision” in the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act.148  The purpose of the provision is essentially to 
protect from infringement liability the service providers who cannot keep track 
                                                                                                                   
 137 Id. at 899–912. 
 138 Id. at 900. 
 139 Id. at 904–05. 
 140 Id. at 905.  
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 906. 
 146 Id. at 907–08. 
 147 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2873–74 (Oct. 28, 
1998). 
 148 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2012). 
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of posts they facilitate on their site.149  In order to fall within the safe harbor, an 
ISP must not have knowledge of or financial benefit that can be directly traced 
from the infringing content present on the network, must have a copyright 
policy and inform its subscribers of that policy, and must list an agent to deal 
with copyright complaints.150  Once providers find out from the copyright 
owner that they are hosting potentially copyright infringing material, the 
provider has a duty to take it down and a duty to inform the person who 
uploaded the content; however, the provider has no duty to investigate whether 
the material actually infringes on copyright.151 
2.  Notice and Takedown in Practice.  The system of “notice and takedown” 
starts when a service provider receives notice of an alleged infraction from a 
copyright owner.152  Next, the ISP will remove the material from the internet or 
block access to it, as is required under the safe harbor provision.153  The ISPs 
must take “reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has 
removed or disabled access to the material.”154  To have the material replaced, 
the person who uploaded it must file a counter-notice.155  After the counter-
notice has been sent, the ISPs must re-enable the content between ten and 
fourteen business days later, unless the copyright holder has by that point filed a 
lawsuit.156 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 512, when a service provider receives a notice of possible 
infringement, that provider must take the material down quickly.157  The 
material will remain offline unless the uploader provides a counter-notice.158  In 
the counter-notification, the uploader/writer must include a signature, 
identification of the material, their name, address, telephone number, and 
consent to jurisdiction in Federal District Court in the judicial district in the 
address where they are located.159  The counter-notice must also state under 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 U.S. Copyright Office Summary, 1, Dec. 1, 1998, http:// 
www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
 150 DMCA Safe Harbor, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/to 
pics/14 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).  
 151 Id.  
 152 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
 153 Id. § 512(g). 
 154 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
 155 Id. § 512(g)(3). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. § 512(c)(1)(C) (“[U]pon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or the subject of 
infringing activity.”). 
 158 See id. § 512(g)(2)(b). 
 159 Id. § 512(g)(3). 
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penalty of perjury that the counter-notice provider has a good faith belief that 
the material does not infringe on copyright.160 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION CREATES INCENTIVES FOR COPYRIGHT 
HOLDERS TO SUPPRESS MATERIAL THAT MAY NOT INFRINGE ON COPYRIGHT  
These elements working together create the type of environment where 
someone like James Joyce’s grandson can control dissemination of derivative 
works long after the protected material was originally published.  As material 
proliferates online, an estate can work within the system to pull material off of 
the Web, whether that material validly infringes on copyright or not.  The 
DMCA system puts the burden on the uploader to file a counter-notice, or see 
their allegedly infringing material stay offline. 
In practice, the Safe Harbor provisions of the DMCA work to silence 
otherwise permissible freedom of expression.  Such notices create incentives for 
the service provider to pull every possibly infringing item off of their site, often 
to the detriment of the uploader and possibly the public as a whole.  In ALS 
Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ, for example, the court refused to grant a service provider 
immunity from infringement liability when a takedown notice was not even 
entirely correct.161  Though takedown notices are required to be specific, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that since the notice substantially 
complied with the DMCA’s requirements, the ISPs must abide by it.162  For 
sites such as YouTube that host high amounts of material and receive many of 
these notices, pursuing an independent investigation of whether the material 
actually infringes on copyright is not feasible or rational.  Instead, these service 
providers will just pull the material down in order to maintain coverage under 
the safe harbor provision.  Thus, service providers often take such “takedown 
notices” at face value without doing any further examination.  Why would they?  
It’s the safest course of action for them to remove the content and then shift 
the burden back to the uploader to claim that it does not infringe upon 
copyright.  In doing so, ISPs remove themselves from the dispute between the 
uploader and content owner. 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Id. § 512(g)(3)(C). 
 161 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 162 Id.  
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B.  THE MECHANISMS ALLOWING UPLOADERS TO PROTECT THEIR CONTENT 
ARE INADEQUATE 
1.  The Fair Use Defense Online.  The fair use defense is an obvious way for an 
uploader to protect their content online.163  There is still some speculation 
regarding the intersection of fair use and the First Amendment, but while “the 
Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required,” the 
Second Circuit noted that “some isolated statements in its opinions might 
arguably be enlisted for such a requirement.”164  Nonetheless, the fair use 
defense is granted by the Copyright Act and the DMCA, so arguments about 
the rights of uploaders who claim fair use under these statutes parallel 
arguments for constitutional protection in light of Eldred’s and Golan’s holding 
that these statutes withstand a First Amendment challenge.  Unfortunately for 
uploaders, however, though the fair use defense would often lead to better 
outcomes if they were actually sued, the fact that the DMCA’s notice system 
leads to little actual litigation means that their interests in fair use are not often 
vindicated. 
Under Golan v. Holder, a significant part of the majority’s opinion argued 
First Amendment concerns could still be vindicated because uploaders of 
derivative content can rely on a fair use defense.165  Inherent in Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument that the First Amendment protections of the CTEA 
vindicated those who wished to perform or publish copyrighted works was the 
idea that, when challenged, these alleged infringers would be able to bring the 
fair use defense.  However, increasing evidence demonstrates that under the 
current DMCA system, uploaders who see their material pulled down are better 
off just letting it happen, and uploading elsewhere, if at all.  For a prime 
example, one only needs to look at the Counter-Notification page online at the 
University of Virginia.166  It contains such language as “[t]o be frank, it is rare 
that the copyright infringement notices we forward to you are in error.”167  It 
also notes that you should only file a counter-notice if “[Y]ou are certain you are 
using the material legally.”168  As courts apply a balancing test for fair use 
defense, it is difficult for someone who lacks a legal education (or even those 
that have one) to be sure that they are using that material legally. 
                                                                                                                   
 163 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 164 Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2001). 
 165 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 166 Information Policy, Copyright at UVa: Counter-Notification, U. VA., http://www.virginia.edu/in 
formationpolicy/copyright/counternotice.html (last modified Oct. 14, 2014). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The DMCA notice system is not only in place to protect rights-holders and 
internet service providers; it is in place to notify uploaders as well of the 
infringement alleged against them.  Copyright holders could file suit against 
those who have uploaded the material without filing a DMCA notice, and just 
move straight to an injunction or litigation.  The DMCA system provides 
uploaders an opportunity to see that they could be sued before a copyright 
holder actually sues.  In theory, this sounds like a system where everyone 
benefits.  However, in practice it has become a system where copyright holders 
can file false claims, leaving uploaders without a way to call them on their bluff.  
Although uploaders could send a counter-notice, evidence shows these are 
under-utilized.  One reason for this may be the notice appears to indicate that 
the uploader will be willing to defend the copyright in court, when an uploader 
would really rather avoid litigation.  Moreover, sending a counter-notice can 
also be costly.  Those that wish to file a counter-notice often need to consult a 
lawyer to be able to do so correctly.  There are also personal costs to the time 
taken to create the counter-notice.  In addition, DMCA takedown notices often 
have intimidating language, which deters uploaders from uploading other 
material, even if they do have a fair use defense.169 
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Stephanie Lenz survived a motion to dismiss 
when Universal had sent her a fraudulent copyright notice over its rights to the 
Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy,” which she used in a twenty-nine-second low-
quality video of her son dancing.170  In a striking parallel to cases of “malicious” 
literary and orator estates, Prince stated that, on principal, no one should use his 
music on the internet without permission, and Universal had done its best to 
completely remove any non-sanctioned Prince music.171  The district court held 
that individuals sending copyright notices must at least consider the fair use 
defense before sending the notice, and that fair use is a lawful use of a 
copyright, rather than an excuse after the fact.172  Additionally, the court made 
an exceptional allowance due to Universal’s knowing misrepresentation and 
awarded her the recovered costs of her actual damages stemming from the 
fraudulent DMCA notice.173  Although this extraordinary outcome granted a 
                                                                                                                   
 169 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (where 
Universal’s bad faith takedown notice caused Lenz to be fearful enough to refrain from uploading 
any other videos after the original takedown notice). 
 170 Id. at 1152. 
 171 Universal’s statement on the matter was “It’s simply a matter of principle. . . . [T]hat’s why, 
over the last few months, we have asked YouTube to remove thousands of different videos that 
use Prince music without his permission.”  Id. 
 172 Id. at 1154–55 (“[I]n the majority of cases, a consideration of fair use prior to issuing a 
takedown notice will not be so complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner’s ability to 
respond rapidly to potential infringements.”). 
 173 Id. at 1156. 
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success to Ms. Lenz, the uploader who actually fights for his or her rights is an 
exception to the rule.174  
Another instance where uploaders successfully invoked the fair use defense 
was illustrated in Online Policy Group v. Diebold, where a group of individuals 
published e-mails about possible problems with Diebold voting machines.175  
The court held that Diebold would be liable if they knowingly misrepresented 
the fact that copyright infringement had occurred.176  However, like Lenz, this 
case also features an exceptional plaintiff, as the takedown notices were sent to 
a group that dealt with online policy—it is tough to believe that the other 
plaintiffs would have brought the case on their own.177 
2.  Burden-Shifting.  Even if the fair use defense adequately protects the 
interests of uploaders, in some circumstances the DMCA contains a provision 
that ultimately unfairly turns the tables against those who upload content.  This 
can be problematic for uploaders from out of the country (who now must 
consent to jurisdiction inside the United States).178  Section 12 raises another 
problem for uploaders.  When their media content is removed from the 
internet, they have one option to return it online: consent to possibly go to 
court against the estate.179  The term “safe harbor provision” means that section 
512 protects the service provider.180  Therefore, if the uploader does want to 
sue, they cannot sue the party who actually removed the content.  Instead, they 
must consent to suit by an estate, often a group of heirs that have a 
considerable amount of money at their disposal. 
C.  ESTATES ARE SPECIAL CASES 
Estates, especially those that own rights of famous authors and creators, and 
want to use their power to pull information out of the public sphere, often have 
a great deal of money at their disposal, which gives them a unique ability to 
utilize the imbalances of the DMCA.181  This creates a disincentive for 
individual uploaders with credible copyright defenses to litigate them.  For a 
clear example of the costs of litigation, one need look no further than Carol 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Ganz, supra note 10, at 758. 
 175 Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 176 Id. at 1202. 
 177 Id. at 1197.  The co-plaintiffs, Nelson Pavlosky and Luke Smith were college students who 
posted the e-mail archive on other websites.  
 178 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D). 
 179 § 512(g)(3)(D). 
 180 Id. § 512(b)(1). 
 181 See Pomerantz & Greenburg, supra note 11 (citing celebrities’ estates as profitable, 
particularly due to royalties).  
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Schloss’s legal battle with the James Joyce estate.182  To avoid a lawsuit with the 
Joyce estate, Carol Schloss, an academic, edited over thirty pages out of a four 
hundred page manuscript after the executor of the estate wrote to her, 
threatening her if she were to use material about Lucia Joyce.183  She was able to 
recover $240,000 in legal fees from the estate, but only after considerable 
amounts of litigation and uncertainty.184 
Another reason why estates somewhat differ from individual copyright 
holders is because they are not the creator of the work.  The estate is the work’s 
protector, the creator’s protector, and most importantly, the estate is often the 
work’s beneficiary.  Our society values the idea that heirs are simply the people 
who the author was trying to provide for with his or her work.  Yet the 
possibility of an estate that not only benefits from the works of its forebear, but 
attempts to exclude the author’s work from society as a whole has not seemed 
to concern many courts or legislatures.  For example, in drafting the Copyright 
Term Extension Act Congress considered what the views of authors and their 
heirs would be, but did not consider the impact on society as a whole.185  
Our copyright law also establishes that copyright protection does not die 
with the author.186  However, the assumption grounding this policy—that heirs 
will be good custodians of the author’s property—may not be based in facts.187  
Estates do not always act rationally.  The Joyce estate, for example has even 
attempted to prevent academic discussion of the work.188  Likewise, the Salinger 
estate (and Salinger himself) worked to prohibit an arguably derivative work and 
a collection of letters from Salinger from going to the public.189  Finally, the 
Martin Luther King Estate has prohibited showing of the “I Have a Dream” 
speech, one of the greatest speeches of the twentieth century.190  
Another relevant question pertains to the identification of those heirs that 
an author would generally intend to benefit.  Though, as noted by the Berne 
Convention and offered as evidence of the need for the CTEA, the average 
lifespan of most industrialized nations are increasing, this cannot really provide 
support for leaving copyright protections at life of the author plus seventy 
                                                                                                                   
 182 See Haven, supra note 88. 
 183 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (2007). 
 184 Id. at 1083; see also Haven, supra note 88.  
 185 Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual Property: The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 219, 225. 
 186 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
(extending copyright protections to life of the author plus seventy years).  
 187 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 222. 
 188 See id. at 258. 
 189 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 190 “I Have a Dream” Leads Top 100 Speeches of the Century, U. WIS.-MADISON NEWS (Dec. 15, 
1999), http://www.news.wisc.edu/releases/3504.html. 
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years.191  One commentator illustrated this through a thought experiment: if one 
assumes that every generation is about twenty-five years, protections for an 
author born in 1971 who dies in 2046 will extend until 2116.192  At that point, 
the author’s great-grandchildren will be sixty years old.193  Thus, the current 
copyright system protects heirs who are extremely far removed from the 
authors themselves.194  It is difficult to draw specific lines in policy discussions 
but it is hard to believe that the creativity associated with a work will receive 
greater honor after seventy years than it would after thirty or fifty years, 
especially as the beneficiaries of the copyright become further and further 
removed from the creator.  
The amount of control estates seek to assert over written works could be 
equated with a kind of fetish195: an irrational attachment to the work to the 
detriment of society.196  Considered in conjunction with the fact that 
copyrighted works are nonrivalrous,197 the personal interests of descendants are 
not interests to which copyright law and policy should elevate.198 
D.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS OF COPYRIGHT 
One of the relevant First Amendment considerations noted by the dissent in 
Golan was the impact of dissemination of information.199  The actions of 
controlling estates such as the Joyce, Martin Luther King, and J.D. Salinger 
estates undeniably worked against information dissemination.  In addition, the 
features of the DMCA have given estates another tool with which to control 
information dissemination. 
Some works of authorship retain value very well over the course of a long 
life.200  However, the Constitution states that copyright must be for a limited 
                                                                                                                   
 191 William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 907, 931–32 (1997). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. 
 195 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 266; see also Schloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 
1073 (2007) (Joyce told Shloss’s publisher that her fair use claim “sounds like a bad joke or 
wishful thinking” and furthermore asked the publisher to “kindly bear in mind that there are 
more than one way [sic] to skin a cat”).  
 196 Symposium, supra note 185, at 266.  
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 200 See, for example, CATCHER IN THE RYE, which is still often assigned for classes or summer 
reading to this day, or a copy of the first edition of ULYSSES that sold for £275,000 in 2009.  Mark 
Brown, First Edition of Ulysses Sells for Record £275,000, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2009), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/books/2009/jun/04/ulysses-sells-record-price.  
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time.201  The fact that the Constitution calls for a limited time would seem to 
imply that such a time should be reasonable.  But it seems unreasonable that the 
great-grandchildren of authors or orators can benefit from their great-
grandfather’s copyrighted work.   
In Golan, Justice Ginsburg also based her decision on the rationale that 
taking a work simply be licensed.202  This rationale, however, does not apply to 
many of the situations discussed above, especially where an author or orator 
estate attempts to prevent a work from entering the public sphere at all. 
In addition, Justice Ginsburg read the statue in Golan as requiring users to 
pay for copyrighted works.203  Again, when it comes to biographers, letters, and 
speeches especially, there may not be much value in licensing.  Ginsburg’s 
argument also hinges on the idea that the copyright holder would be willing to 
license the material out, whether for personal gain or for the betterment of 
society.  In fact, copyright holders may instead attempt to control the 
dissemination of information, to prohibit something from coming to light that 
they do not agree with, or attempt to protect the creator’s image or integrity of 
the work.204  
In Golan, Justice Breyer highlighted the problem this poses for those who 
want to use the work.205  His concerns are exacerbated for those who want to 
post material online.  To maintain compliance with the law, someone wishing to 
use the material must track down the copyright owner.206  If they do not, or the 
copyright owner refuses to comply, the copyright owner can send a takedown 
notice under the DMCA, which will allow the host site to remove the 
supposedly offending material.  However, much of this goes unnoticed by 
courts because the system inherently works to keep these issues out of court.  A 
common course of action when one receives a counter notice is to simply do 
nothing, and allow the material to be pulled off the Web.  It is easy to see how 
an uploader would choose this, if they appeared to be facing off against an 
estate or a corporation that had considerable amounts of money at its disposal.  
They also may simply not have a particularly vested interest in maintaining the 
content online.  While pulling their material off the Web may damage 
uploaders’ interests, it could be more difficult for uploaders to subject 
themselves to litigation, especially if they are not very well funded.  In addition, 
the notice and takedown system fails to consider the public interest in making 
the work available to a broader audience.  
                                                                                                                   
 201 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (“by securing for limited times”). 
 202 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 203 Id. at 893 (majority opinion). 
 204 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 205 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 206 See id. at 905. 
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Many DMCA claims also are without merit.207  In 2009, Google estimated 
that more than half of the DMCA takedown notices it received were sent by 
businesses targeting competitors and 37% of notices were not valid copyright 
claims.208   The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse maintains a database of cease-
and desist and takedown letters online.209  In a study by the Brennan Center for 
Justice and New York University School of Law, researchers examined many of 
these takedown notices, and found that almost half of them sought to remove 
material with what appear to be solid fair use or First Amendment defenses.210  
Even with these high numbers of invalid claims, there is still not impetus for an 
alleged infringer to fight a DMCA notice.  
While we have discussed burdens placed on uploaders of content, there are 
also valid considerations as to estates themselves and children of authors.  One 
rationale behind copyright protection for written works is that it is often 
claimed that a motivation for writing is the need to provide for children.211  
This claim may or may not hold water.  For example, it is unlikely that Martin 
Luther King copyrighted the “I Have a Dream” speech in order to provide for 
his children, at least in monetary terms.  In addition, the literary market is 
extremely difficult to break into—the vast majority of books are doomed to 
obscurity and make very little money.212  In addition, this assertion does not 
take into account other forms of writing—letters that have been given to 
museums, recordings of speeches, and other works that may have literary value 
but in general are not monetized.  Any author who has achieved fame within his 
or her lifetime can expect that one of his or her letters may someday find its 
way into a museum, just as a famous orator would expect a speech to be 
transcribed. 
Since author estates owned by creators’ children are not actually the 
speakers, just the “enablers” of a copyrighted speech, their only interests that 
appear to relate to the First Amendment involve the suppression, rather than 
expression of speech.213  As mentioned, they may keep media and works out of 
the public sphere to prohibit certain kinds of discussion about the work.  It is 
strange that the First Amendment would reach out to protect suppression of 
speech by the heirs of the original speakers more than expression by others.  
                                                                                                                   
 207 Google Provides Numbers on Just how Often DMCA Takedown Process is Abused, TECHDIRT, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090315/2033134126.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).  
 208 Id.  
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 210 See Meyers, supra note 13, at 233–34.  
 211 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 256.  
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Furthermore, once the original creator has passed away, it is extremely difficult 
to determine what their interests actually were when creating the work.  
One area where estates may have a legitimate First Amendment interest is 
freedom of association.  It seems obvious that the law should prohibit someone 
from impersonating the author or estate, and that the estate has a valid First 
Amendment interest in not wanting to appear to endorse speech that they do 
not agree with (or just do not want to exist).214  However, there are sufficient 
safeguards in place to deal with impersonation of an author, but copyright 
owners are protected by the Copyright Act’s requirements for derivative 
works.215 
E.  SOLUTIONS 
The problem of the “malicious estate” highlighted the need for new 
solutions to copyright problems online in the digital age.  Though a complete 
overhaul of our current system seems unlikely, three proposals could help to fix 
the problems.  Many of Justice Ginsburg’s considerations as to the 
constitutionality of the statutes in Golan and Eldred have been warped in the 
years since those decisions.  Most importantly, the fair use defense has not been 
the bulwark against expression-related harms that the majority felt it would be.  
The problem of the “malicious” estate, and the ease with which that estate can 
exercise its power has highlighted the need for new copyright protection 
schemes.  One possibility is a limited licensing scheme that would still respect 
the rights of authors and their heirs while making it easier for those who wish to 
use materials do so at a reasonable price.  In addition, recent developments in 
copyright protection have made it easier for internet providers to monitor their 
own networks.  Legal scholars have also proposed other copyright frameworks 
that would increase the ability for uploaders of content to vindicate their First 
Amendment rights. 
1.  Modified Licensing System.  When attempting to craft policy solutions to the 
issues arising from the intersection of the DMCA, malicious estates, especially 
the problems created by imposing these costs on educators and those seeking to 
publish works or incorporate works of authors and orators into their writings, it 
is helpful to look to Justice Breyer’s concerns in Golan.  Justice Breyer mostly 
focused on concerns about spurring the creation of new works, and the issue of 
orphan works (those works that would be impossible to locate and correctly 
use).  In addition, in Eldred, Justice Breyer confronted the idea of “expression 
                                                                                                                   
 214 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 
(holding that speakers have a right to determine their message and not convey that of other 
groups). 
 215 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).  
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related harm”—a strong First Amendment concern that the CTE would 
interfere with efforts to educate, and restrict propagation of copyright works, in 
part, because the term extension made copyright “virtually perpetual,” 
benefitting not those who created works, but rather those estates that still held 
the rights to them. 
Licensing fees could work to curb the heavy burden on content uploaders 
under the DMCA.216  The government could set the fees, or they could be 
regulated by the industries themselves.  Another solution often proposed is the 
one espoused by the litigants in Eldred—to pull back the copyright period after 
an author’s death.  In short, they would call on Congress to restrict the 
copyright period to some length of time substantially shorter than seventy years, 
replacing the CTEA. 
If we look to the concerns of Justice Breyer, however, it appears that we 
should take a more limited view than just applying licensing fees across the 
board to all material on the internet.  This would also be overbroad, would have 
the end result of chilling speech, and would not take into consideration the 
built-in defenses to copyright claims.  Furthermore, there may be less disruptive 
means of changing our current copyright landscape. 
I would propose a solution that merges both ideas, at least in terms of online 
material.  After some shorter period than seventy years, such as twenty, 
copyrights would not lose protection, but would rather lapse into a licensing 
scheme.  This would completely preserve the author’s rights during life, and 
keep them operating functionally the same way from much of their heirs’ life.  
Licensing fees would need to be regulated to deal with the “malicious estate” 
problem, but would allow more materials to be posted online.  In addition, for 
those whose works have a high level of cultural value, a system where people 
can pay a reasonable fee to use the material could lead to higher profits.  Since 
the U.S. government already issues copyright protections, it could also help with 
the orphan works issue to have an automatic licensing system.  In short, if one 
only needed to look up in a database where to send the licensing fee to, it would 
eliminate the problem of tracking that creator down. 
A unique function of the DMCA is of course the notice and takedown 
system.  Under a post-death online copyright licensing scheme the notices 
themselves could be harnessed to provide more avenues for those who want to 
use material to be able to do so without risking a visit to court to vindicate their 
fair use rights. 
                                                                                                                   
 216 Congress already requires mandatory licensing in some areas.  See id. § 115.  In addition, 
licensing schemes have been proposed as early as 1878.  See also Symposium, supra note 185, at 
241–42.  
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2.  Remove Safe Harbor/Increase the Requirements of the Provision for Internet Service 
Providers.  Another possible solution to mitigate the abuse of DMCA takedown 
notices by uncompromising estates or other copyright holders in general would 
be to alter the safe harbor provision to incentivize service providers to 
investigate the allegedly infringing material before pulling it off the internet.  
The obvious problem with this solution is implementation.  Service providers 
do not have time to look at every single notice that they receive because they 
receive such a high volume.  Therefore, the idea of compelling each ISP to 
review each allegedly infringing material before pulling it seems far-fetched.  
However, with increases in the power of technology, signs point towards a time 
when such a requirement would be feasible with automation.  As an example, 
Google processed around eight URL takedowns per second during the last 
week of September 2013.217  Though Google is certainly an outlier on the high 
end of DMCA notice recipients, they have implemented some safeguards to 
prevent erroneous URLs from being taken down from their search service, 
perhaps because they have even received allegedly infringing URLs that lead to 
their own “Gmail” service.218  The fact that Google can implement some basic 
safeguards demonstrates that this is something that could be done by normal 
ISPs in the future, even if not at the moment.  
In all, the incentivization for service providers to better investigate allegedly 
infringing material would not be complete until the safe harbor provision is 
altered.  The safe harbor provision should not be removed, however.  It should 
just be modified by language requiring a good faith effort to determine whether 
the allegedly infringing copyright material actually infringes upon copyright.  
Furthermore, with such a system there is another problem of implementation: 
that a service provider may, in an effort to protect itself, pull much more 
material than is necessary off the Web by using automated services.  For a 
prime example of this problem, one needs only look to YouTube copyright 
“crackdown” that happened in late 2013.219  Such automated systems can be 
overbroad, and open up service providers to liability for a lax effort to 
determine what content is permissible incentivizes those service providers to 
aggressively remove materials. 
                                                                                                                   
 217 Gmail Stays Up as Google Rejects Microsoft DMCA Takedown Notice, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 2, 
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3.  Alternative Proposals.  Some legal scholars have endorsed a copyright 
system that turns on a fixed number of years without renewals.  Such a system 
would have a long period (one proposal lists it at ninety-five years).220  This 
would create some sense of certainty in terms of copyright period, but would 
do little to help those who wished to assert a defense under the Copyright Act 
online.  Another possibility offered by legal scholars is to create a copyright that 
would exist perpetually, but would require frequent renewals.  This solution 
would generally only be economically feasible for the copyright holder to 
maintain for around fifteen years.221  Therefore, it would lead to more works 
entering the public domain as rights holders let copyrights lapse rather than 
spend the money to renew them. It would also allow works that are actually 
valuable to stay protected by copyright as long as they remained valuable.222  
Since more total works would be in the public domain, the amount of DMCA 
notices would decrease, and in all more First Amendment protections would be 
vindicated.  However, this perpetual copyright solution demanding renewal 
would do nothing to protect against estates that have a great deal of money and 
are willing to expend the effort to keep works from entering the public domain. 
To be sure, none of these policy proposals would completely eliminate the 
problems springing from the DMCA.  By their nature, any of these proposals 
strikes some sort of balance between rights-holders and content upholders.  
However, a modified licensing system would likely go the farthest in protecting 
expression, provided licensing fees could actually be kept reasonable.  Those 
worried about vindicating their expression rights under the first amendment, 
however, may not need to worry for very long, as technology may soon come to 
the point where it can identify those items with fair use defenses online. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If all else fails, much of the root of the problems under the DMCA can be 
traced back to the fact that people cannot adequately vindicate their rights when 
they receive a DMCA notice.223  With an estate protecting a lucrative copyright, 
there is a decided power imbalance that leads to an inordinate amount of 
material pulled from the Web.224  As exemplified by these powerful estates, 
copyright power can be abused.  When it comes to the work of authors and 
orators, there is a definite educational value to be gained in publication of their 
works, and a dedicated fair use protection for these educational purposes.  
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The DMCA’s shift of power from uploaders to copyright holders is felt 
particularly strongly in the context of a malicious author or orator estate.  Here, 
there are often materials that should be allowed by fair use (such as those used 
for educational purposes).  However, a powerful estate, rather than the original 
creator of the content, can wield great power over the materials online.  As 
DMCA takedown notices render fair use, they are inadequate to vindicate 
uploaders’ First Amendment rights.  Under the CTEA’s life plus seventy years 
provision, this problem will not go away any time soon.  In addition to their 
failure to vindicate fair use defenses, the incentives created by the current 
DMCA system leads uploaders to let their material be pulled off the Web, if 
they even find out that it has been removed in the first place.  Though much of 
the DMCA system goes on behind the scenes, rather than in courtrooms, as we 
enter a more digitally oriented society these problems are only going to become 
more and more visible.  Currently what we see litigated is just the tip of the 
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